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ABSTRACT
For people starting from a presumption in favor of equality, the very idea of 
a sufficiency threshold where the demands of justice would stop because 
everyone has enough is puzzling. However, Liam Shields, offers an account 
of sufficiency that has the potential to reconcile these egalitarians with the 
principle of sufficiency. This comes from his endorsement of what he calls 
“the shift thesis”, stating roughly that there is a discontinuity in the weight 
of our reasons to benefit people once they have enough. This thesis 
distinguishes his theory from other accounts of sufficientarianism by not 
denying the injustice of inequalities above the threshold. It thereby 
changes the way one can look at the relation between sufficiency and 
equality. The principle of sufficiency becomes the first principle of a 
conception of justice that must be completed by another – possibly 
egalitarian – principle. In the first section, I start with a brief exposition of 
the shift thesis and the way it relates to other accounts of sufficiency. In the 
second, I introduce a distinction between agnosticism and indifference 
towards inequalities above the sufficiency threshold. In the third, I argue 
that pragmatism might provide positive reasons to focus on insufficiency 
if one is agnostic about these inequalities. I conclude with a brief discussion 
of this pragmatic stance and of the choice to defend a partial view of justice 
as Shields does.
Keywords:  equality, sufficiency, justice, pragmatism, ideal theory
For people starting from a presumption in favor of equality, or the intuition 
that unless there is a good reason to do otherwise, any distribution of goods or 
advantages should be equal, the very idea of a sufficiency threshold where the 
1 I thank David Axelsen, Axel Gosseries, Lasse Nielsen, Liam Shields, Julia Sichieri 
Moura and the anonymous reviewers for useful comments on previous versions of this 
paper.
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demands of justice would stop because everyone has enough is puzzling. 
What puzzles them in particular is that some inequalities are tolerated by 
sufficientarians although they do not have a special moral justification (such 
as being the result of genuine choices, valuable efforts, or ‘sacrifice’ for the 
community).
The main merit of Liam Shields’ stimulating account of sufficiency as a 
demand of justice is to potentially reconcile these egalitarians2 with the 
principle of sufficiency. This comes from Shields’ endorsement of what he 
calls “the shift thesis”, stating roughly that there is a discontinuity in the 
weight of our reasons to benefit people once they have enough. This thesis 
distinguishes his theory from other accounts of sufficientarianism by not 
denying the injustice of inequalities above the threshold. It thereby changes 
the way one can look at the relation between sufficiency and equality. The 
principle of sufficiency becomes the first principle of a conception of justice 
that must be completed by another – possibly egalitarian – principle.
In the first section, I will start with a brief exposition of the shift thesis and 
the way it relates to other accounts of sufficiency. Then, in light of this, I will 
introduce in the second section a distinction between agnosticism and 
indifference towards inequalities above the sufficiency threshold, Shields’ 
position being associated with agnosticism. In the third section, I will argue 
that pragmatism might provide reasons to focus on insufficiency and leave 
aside other inequalities if one is agnostic about them. And I will conclude with 
a brief discussion of this pragmatic stance and of the choice to defend a partial 
view of justice as Shields does.
1. THE SHIFT THESIS AND THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF 
SUFFICIENTARIANISM
As highlighted years ago by Paula Casal, sufficientarianism is usually 
conceived as the combination of two different theses: a positive thesis 
stressing “the importance of people living above a certain threshold” 
(Casal 2007: 297-298), and a negative thesis denying “the relevance of 
certain additional distributive requirements” (298). Many people think 
that it is the negative thesis that makes of sufficientarianism a complete 
2 Egalitarians committed to “comparative fairness” (Temkin 2017) must be 
distinguished from other egalitarians, like many relational egalitarians, whose position is 
compatible with some forms of (relational) sufficientarianism. From the latter perspective, 
if people have enough to stand in a relation of equality with others, no additional 
redistribution is required. Yet from the viewpoint of comparative fairness, any distributive 
inequality must be justifiable, whatever its impact on social relations.
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and distinctive conception of justice3. It is complete because there are no 
distributive requirements other than those expressed by the principle of 
sufficiency. And it is distinctive because it is the only conception of justice 
that gives a pivotal role to some threshold of sufficiency and disregards 
the remaining inequalities.
In contrast, the mere affirmation of the positive thesis can be included 
or absorbed into a more complete and ‘hybrid’ conception of justice such 
as sufficiency-constrained (luck) egalitarianism4 or sufficiency-
constrained (responsibility-catering) prioritarianism (318-323).
However, Shields proposes another way of understanding the 
distinctiveness of sufficientarianism. He endorses the positive thesis, 
which he formulates as follows: “We have weighty non-instrumental 
reasons to secure at least enough of some good(s)” (Shields 2016: 28). But 
he rejects the negative one – which he calls “upper limit sufficientarianism” 
– because of its “inability to condemn some regressive policies, which 
require greater contributions from the worse off than the better off [when 
they are both above the threshold], and are unable to condemn huge 
inequalities between those who have secured enough” (23). 
Yet, recognizing that the positive view is not enough to distinguish 
sufficientarianism from other views of justice that might also include 
this concern (among others), Shields adds what he calls the “shift thesis”: 
“Once people have secured enough, there is a discontinuity in the rate of 
change of the marginal weight of our reasons to benefit them further” 
(30). This shift thesis is, according to him, what distinguishes sufficiency 
from priority, because prioritarians usually believe that “priority to the 
worse-off diminishes at a continuous rate” (30), whereas the 
sufficientarian threshold marks a discontinuity. This also explains why 
he does not endorse luck or outcome equality: because unless these views 
are coupled with a sufficiency constraint, they do not do justice to this 
discontinuity in the moral importance of redistributions. However, if 
prioritarianism or egalitarianism were to include a sufficiency constraint, 
they would become compatible with the principle of sufficiency. Yet 
Shields does not arbitrate between priority, equality and other candidates. 
He simply recognizes that the shift thesis is “compatible with a wide 
range of distributive criteria once everyone has secured enough” (34). 
3 See for example Axelsen and Nielsen 2015: 407-408: “[t]he acceptance of the 
negative thesis is [….] distinctively sufficientarian”.
4 Here we should distinguish between forms of egalitarianism that are themselves 
sufficientarian (this is the case of several ‘relational’ egalitarian views), others that include 
a sufficiency constraint, and others yet that reject the moral significance of any sufficiency 
threshold.
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As Shields rejects the negative thesis, we can characterize his 
sufficientarianism as a distincticve yet partial view of justice. The principle 
of sufficiency is not enough by itself, as it does not provide guidance 
regarding the treatment of inequalities above the sufficiency threshold. 
It requires a complementary principle which can be, for example, 
outcome or luck egalitarian, utilitarian, prioritarian, leximin or maximin 
– the second principle applying specifically to what we might call the 
residual inequalities. 
What is particularly interesting with Shields’ view is that it illustrates 
the distinction that should be made between agnosticism and indifference 
towards these residual inequalities5. Although principles of sufficiency 
are often defended in opposition to principles of equality (see for example 
Frankfurt 2015; Crisp 2003; Axelsen and Nielsen 2015), Shields’ view 
makes them potentially compatible. It sheds light on the fact that 
sufficientarians are not necessarily morally indifferent towards residual 
inequalities. Hence, it makes sufficientarianism attractive for people 
committed to comparative fairness and yet convinced of the centrality of 
people having enough. To be sure, this is not new (see Casal 2007 or 
Gosseries 2011), but this point has usually been made by egalitarians 
interested in sufficiency, not by sufficientarians. What is more, the shift 
thesis introduced by Shields has the merit of making this compatibility 
between sufficiency and equality appear more clearly.
2. . INDIFFERENCE AND AGNOSTICISM TOWARDS 
RESIDUAL INEQUALITIES
Given that sufficientarians face more egalitarian alternatives6, they must 
be able to provide convincing reasons not to equalize social positions 
beyond what is required to achieve their goal. In other words, they must be 
able to justify their choice for a principle of sufficiency rather than some 
principle of equality (or another alternative conception of justice). 
Nonetheless, as Shields’ case illustrates, some sufficientarians do not 
5 Axelsen and Nielsen (2015: 423), for example, seem to conflate the two attitudes, 
using one term and then the other as if they were similar.
6 Outcome egalitarianism is certainly more egalitarian than any account of 
sufficientarianism. Yet regarding luck egalitarianism, things are more complex. Given its 
emphasis on choice, luck egalitarianism can be both more and less egalitarian than 
sufficientarianism. Unless they include a form of sensitivity to personal responsibility in 
their principle, which they usually refuse to do (Gosseries 2011: 473), sufficientarians will 
generally accept more inequalities (related to bad luck) than luck egalitarians, but they will 
also sometimes reject some inequalities (related to choice) that luck egalitarians might have 
accepted.
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provide this justification. Shields rejects principles of equality that fail to 
take into account the discontinuity introduced by the sufficiency threshold, 
but he does not provide a justification for not adopting a form of sufficiency-
constrained egalitarianism. And this might be explained by agnosticism 
towards residual inequalities. Agnostic sufficientarians have a strong 
feeling or intuition that deprivation (and/or domination) is unjust, but 
they do not know whether inequalities between well-off people – or 
billionaires as in the caricatural example often discussed – should be 
characterized as unjust or not7.
Another possibility is that they have an opinion about these inequalities, 
but they do not know how to argue in favor of it, or consider it a waste of 
time to make this argument. In this case, they are not really agnostic 
themselves, but they withhold their judgment and thereby endorse an 
agnostic position.
In contrast with the agnostics, other sufficientarians such as Harry 
Frankfurt are morally indifferent towards residual inequalities. The two 
attitudes must be carefully distinguished. Agnosticism entails either 
admitting that one does not know if these inequalities are unjust, or 
explicitly withholding judgment – which Shields does, for example. Moral 
indifference means that one does not consider these inequalities as unjust. 
What can explain such moral indifference? Following Roger Crisp8, for 
example, one might believe that it is envy that leads some of us to develop 
hostility towards some inequalities which are not unjust in themselves 
(Crisp 2003: 749), and that it is compassion, not envy, that should feed our 
judgments of justice and injustice. Although we feel compassion for those 
who are badly off, we do not feel compassion for well off people having less 
than other well off people. Hence, rather than pursuing “envy-freeness” 
through equalizations of bundles of resources, as Dworkin (1981) would 
recommend, we should fight against feelings of envy and accept some 
inequalities as an integral part of social life.
Crisp’s argument about envy can of course be objected to. It is not 
because a judgment (of justice) comes from an inappropriate attitude 
(envy) that it is wrong9. Nevertheless, it provides us with one explanation 
why one might be indifferent to inequalities above the sufficiency 
7 As suggested to me by David Axelsen, they might also think that we cannot know 
because we are so far from that world and therefore lack epistemic access to intuitions about 
these kinds of cases.
8 Crisp himself may not be morally indifferent towards residual inequalities as he 
expresses sympathy for utilitarianism above the sufficiency threshold (Crisp 2003: 758), and 
utilitarianism can have redistributive implications.
9 I thank the reviewer who pointed this out.
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threshold: a kind of psychological moderation or wisdom characterized by 
the absence of envy, which is obviously more plausible if the sufficiency 
threshold is relatively high. Yet some people might also be envy-free for the 
simple reason that most people in the world are poorer than them. This 
could be characterized as biased sufficientarianism: although this 
sufficientarian has more than what is sufficient and would probably still 
have more in a situation where everyone had enough, s/he affirms that 
sufficiency is enough for the others. In other words, the indifference 
towards residual inequalities is explained by the fact that the person gains 
from these inequalities compared with a more egalitarian distribution. To 
be sure, no sufficientarian is likely to recognize him/herself in this picture. 
Yet this could be an unconscious bias10. And if we want to build impartial 
moral judgments, we should certainly distrust principles of justice that 
suit our self-interest, especially when we are quite well off and unlikely to 
be victims of strong injustices, as most professional philosophers are11.
Hence, there is a variety of factors that can explain indifference towards 
residual inequalities: among others, a particular understanding of the 
notion of justice and the idea that it should be exclusively based on 
compassion; a rejection of envious comparisons; or, in some cases, a 
positional bias. In the next section, I would like to explore a more positive 
reason why one might be attracted by the principle of sufficiency and 
disregard residual inequalities: pragmatism. And I will suggest that this 
could explain Shields’ focus on the injustice of insufficiency although he 
does not completely reject prioritarian and egalitarian views (provided 
that they include a sufficiency constraint). In other words, the aim of the 
next section is to provide a charitable interpretation of the reasons one 
might have to disregard some inequalities. It is an attempt to understand 
the appeal of sufficientarianism from an egalitarian perspective.
3. THE PRAGMATIC APPEAL OF SUFFICIENTARIANISM
What I will call here pragmatism about justice consists in endorsing a 
principle of justice in light of practical considerations such as its urgency, 
its achievability, or its action-guidingness12. Let us examine these three 
10 Similarly, some luck egalitarians or libertarians might be affected by a self-
entitlement bias giving them the impression that they deserve more than others. The risk of 
bias is not specific to sufficientarianism.
11 Certainly, you do not need to have more than enough to defend upper-limit 
sufficientarianism, but you are less likely to hold this view if you are not above the threshold.
12 This kind of pragmatism differs from the one defended by Elizabeth Anderson and 
consisting in starting political philosophy from a diagnosis of the injustices in the real world 
(see Anderson 2010: 3).
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possibilities in turn. 
First, some might see situations of insufficiency or deprivation as an 
urgency to be solved13. Hence, they might consider it preferable to focus on 
that than on debates about what an implausible equal society would look 
like. The pragmatism, here, consists in selecting the focus of one’s theory 
in light of what is the most politically important or urgent. In Shields’ case, 
given that he does not seem to have a strong preference or a firm view in 
the debate between equality and priority above the threshold, this 
consideration of urgency might explain the choice to defend a partial 
conception of justice and leave the remaining question open. In particular, 
if it is true that there is this discontinuity in our reasons to benefit people 
once everyone has enough, as he argues, it becomes even more legitimate 
to focus on the urgency of insufficiency. This duty appears as more 
stringent14, and as having priority.
Second, some might think that their fellow citizens are probably more 
willing to accept the principle of sufficiency – which is in line with the 
human right to a decent standard of living – than a more demanding15 and 
more controversial ideal of equality. Or they might think that it would 
already be something to reach sufficiency for all, that it is already utopian 
enough. They would thus prefer the principle of sufficiency for its relative 
political achievability. This kind of pragmatism is often called “non-ideal 
theory”, or “realism”. It rejects the kind of idealist or utopian theorizing 
that “does not represent an ideal of political life achievable under even the 
most favorable circumstances” (Galston 2010: 387). Ian Shapiro, whose 
view of justice as non-domination is sufficientarian, can be taken as an 
example of such attitude, as he criticizes many theories of justice for being 
politically irrelevant (Shapiro 2016: 11-12). Such reasoning might play a 
conscious or unconscious role in one’s choice to focus on sufficiency. 
Shields himself recognizes, without developing further, the advantages of 
sufficientarianism in light of non-ideal theory’s willingness to set “interim 
goals that can be achieved” (2016: 199).
Third, one might be led away from luck and outcome egalitarianism 
because they are not action-guiding enough. Several luck egalitarians, for 
example, insist that levelling down might sometimes be required by justice, 
13 See for example Nathanson 2005: 373, although he argues that decency is even 
more urgent than sufficiency and should therefore be the criterion of economic justice.
14 Shields actually gives an important role to this notion of stringency in his 
discussion of global justice (Shields 2016: 177; Harb and Axelsen 2017).
15 Note that although most sufficiency principles are less demanding in terms of 
redistributions than their egalitarian alternatives, a responsibility insensitive principle of 
sufficiency (especially with a high threshold) might be very demanding as it would require 
frequent transfers of resources to the imprudent, for example (see Gosseries 2011: 486-487).
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but they press to add that other considerations will militate against 
levelling down in most cases. In so doing, they can appeal to value pluralism 
and downplay the importance of justice, which they may consider as an 
important value among other important values such as community and 
collective well-being for example (see Temkin 2000: 155; Cohen 2008: 7; 
2011: 231; Lippert-Rasmussen 2015). Yet if they do this, one risk is to lose the 
action-guiding force of the principle of justice (Meijers and Vandamme, 
2018). In order to know how to act so as to make the world better, we would 
then need to take into account not only what justice requires, but also 
other values we care about16. Hence, those who want to maintain the 
policy-guiding role of the concept of justice have pragmatic reasons to 
reject the principles of luck and outcome equality. The principle of 
sufficiency becomes more attractive, in this respect, because it does guide 
action. If a person suffers from deprivation, she must be helped, no matter 
how this happened and what other values we care about. Furthermore, the 
principle of sufficiency avoids most of the counter-intuitive implications 
plaguing more egalitarian principles when they are (mistakenly) 
interpreted as action-guiding principles (see Frankfurt 2015).17 
Shields actually seems to endorse the view that principles of justice 
should directly guide action, which appears in his affirmation that if a 
principle “had little significance in terms of policy implications […] then it 
could not have an extensive role in our thought” (Shields 2016: 10-11). This 
might seem uncontroversial, but it is actually not obvious if one considers 
G. A. Cohen’s distinction between fundamental principles of justice and 
rules of regulation, the latter only including non-moral considerations 
such as efficiency, achievability and others in order to directly guide action 
(Cohen 2008). In the latter view, principles of justice do not by themselves 
have policy implications, but only when they are associated with the 
relevant facts and additional values. What Shields seems to be looking for 
is a clear rule of regulation, and this pragmatic motivation might partly 
explain his non-selection of luck or outcome equality as the primary or 
secondary principle of justice. This would not make these alternative 
16 Unless there are no other values at stake. But if justice is reduced to comparative 
fairness, this will not often occur. Most of the time, policies with distributive effects also 
have aggregative (or relational) effects. Taxation is probably the best example. You cannot 
just focus on its distributive dimension.
17 One should nevertheless note that if one is concerned with levelling down, as is the 
case with Frankfurt, the principle of sufficiency may not be the most attractive. Many people 
will agree that sufficiency for all cannot be pursued at any cost. If, for example, bringing a 
single person to the sufficiency threshold has a huge cost, and for the same price you could 
bring an incredible amount of people further away from the threshold, many people will 
consider it counter-intuitive to opt for the former option. Hence, the principle of priority 
might appear more attractive – or leximin egalitarianism, not considered by Frankfurt 
(Gosseries 2011: 468).
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principles unjust, but merely inappropriate for Shields’ purposes, which is 
a very different conclusion.
Hence, there is a variety of pragmatic reasons for focusing on the 
injustice of insufficiency. These reasons do not by themselves justify moral 
indifference towards residual inequalities, but they help us understand 
why one might want to take an agnostic position and leave this issue aside, 
as Shields does.
4. DISCUSSION
Let us take stock. Shields argues that there is a discontinuity in our reasons 
to benefit people once they have enough (1). His rejection of upper-limit 
sufficientarianism seems to indicate that he is not indifferent towards 
inequalities above the sufficiency threshold, but adopts an agnostic 
position (2). His choice to focus exclusively on the injustice of insufficiency, 
while leaving open the question of residual inequalities could be motivated 
by pragmatic reasons (3). 
1) If the shift thesis is correct (which it is not the aim of this paper to 
assess18), then the principle of sufficiency should become part of any 
plausible conception of justice. Securing sufficiency for all should be the 
priority. Yet the very idea of a discontinuity in the rate of change of the 
marginal weight of our reasons to benefit people, as opposed to upper-limit 
sufficientarianism, entails that sufficiency cannot be enough. Shields’ 
view of justice stands in need of a complement.
2) Agnosticism is a perfectly legitimate philosophical stance. It has 
been part of the philosophical wisdom for centuries to recognize our 
inability to answer some questions. And if it is pragmatism that leads you 
to sufficientarianism, you might legitimately want to leave aside the 
trickiest philosophical questions to focus on urgent injustices. You might 
also (mistakenly) think that we will never have to practically address the 
question of residual inequalities, because the battle to achieve sufficiency 
for all will already take centuries. Yet if one enters the philosophical debate 
about justice, the question is necessarily raised: why not more equality? 
And in addition to this, a lot of services we benefit from in affluent societies 
would be above most sufficiency thresholds and yet raise issues of justice19. 
Hence, the question matters both theoretically and practically. This being 
said, I agree that it matters less, politically, than defending sufficiency for 
all.
18 See Nielsen 2017 for a more critical view.
19 I thank Axel Gosseries for this suggestion.
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However, as long as one remains agnostic about these inequalities, one 
cannot defend a complete theory of justice; only a partial one, which is also 
legitimate. A partial theory of justice points towards a specific kind of 
injustice, without the ambition to provide a full picture of a just society. 
Feminism, for example, can be interpreted as a partial theory of justice, 
laying the emphasis on the diversity of injustices suffered by women. But 
most feminist views of justice are (or can be) integrated into a broader 
framework20, not always explicit, which can be egalitarian, sufficientarian, 
utilitarian or other. In the same vein, sufficientarianism advocating for the 
positive thesis but not the negative one is a partial view of justice, laying 
the emphasis on the injustice of deprivation, or insufficiency21 (and 
possibly its effects on social relations). 
What is particularly interesting in Shields-like accounts of 
sufficientarianism is that they open the door to reconciliation between 
(usually) competing views of justice (see also Casal 2007 and Gosseries 
2011). One could endorse two principles – sufficiency and outcome or luck 
equality – as a matter of justice, and sufficiency-constrained prioritarianism 
or leximin as a rule of regulation allowing departures from justice for 
efficiency reasons. Redefined as a partial view of justice, the sufficiency 
principle will be more difficult to attack and might come to be recognized 
as an essential component of any attractive complete theory of justice, as 
Shields hopes.
Nevertheless, Shields’ argument will probably not convince those who 
are morally indifferent to residual inequalities. The reason is that it 
renounces to argue in favor of sufficientarianism as a complete and 
distinctive theory of justice, superior to its egalitarian, prioritarian and 
other competitors. In a sense, what Shields does amounts to admitting that 
there are no good reasons to put forward in favor of the negative thesis, or 
upper-limit sufficientarianism, or the idea that, once everyone has enough, 
there are no more requirements of justice. 
3) Many people include pragmatic considerations in their reasoning 
about justice, without necessarily realizing or acknowledging it. Hence, 
they might be tempted to deny it and affirm that they have principled 
reasons to defend the view they are attracted to. 
Choosing a principle of justice for pragmatic reasons raises several 
questions, already much discussed in the debate about ideal vs non-ideal 
20 The contemporary emphasis on intersectionality (Crenshaw 1991), or the idea that 
women are at the intersection of diverse group affiliations and identities, and hence diverse 
claims of justice, is an attempt to relocate feminism into a broader picture of justice.
21 As Shields (2016: 27) argues, “deprivation” might point to an excessively low 
threshold of sufficiency.
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theory (see among others Estlund 2014). Hence I shall limit myself here to 
one comment. Being pragmatic is as such not only legitimate but desirable. 
Nevertheless, by including pragmatic considerations in one’s conception 
of justice, one runs the risk of making discussions about justice more 
confused22, because justice becomes relative to the author or speaker’s 
appreciation of what is achievable or useful, for example. As there will 
likely never be a consensus on what is and what is not achievable or useful, 
there is no common ground to discuss justice, which is highly problematic 
both from the viewpoint of a community of scientific research and from 
the perspective of a democratic community searching for common 
political principles. Hence, before aiming at agreeing on common principles 
of justice, we should first try to reach agreement on the concept of justice: 
in this concept, do we include pragmatic considerations or not? And it 
might prove easier to agree on a principle of justice leaving aside pragmatic 
considerations. Most objections to luck egalitarianism, for example, are 
practical. If it was not expected to have disincentivizing effects, 
disrespectful implications or difficulties of implementation, few people 
would still object to it. In contrast, the appreciation of what is feasible 
depends a great deal on one’s optimism, knowledge of the relevant facts, or 
appreciation of human nature. Of course, these pragmatic considerations 
would inevitably reenter the debate at a later stage, but separating the tasks 
might reduce confusion.
Cohen’s distinction between fundamental principles of justice and 
rules of regulation helps avoiding some debates and confusions about the 
practicality of different theories of justice. From this perspective, defending 
a fundamental principle of justice does not commit you to all its 
implications. The principle does not in itself imply anything about how 
one ought to act all things considered. And justice is not the only thing that 
matters: you might care about justice and efficiency, and political 
pragmatism, without mixing all these considerations in an all-
encompassing principle. Accepting such distinctions might make many 
disagreements between egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians 
disappear. They could then work together towards establishing appropriate 
rules of regulation in different contexts. Yet the logic of academic research, 
giving a high premium to apparent originality, or the capacity to distinguish 
one’s view from the others’, does not foster agreement between competing 
22  This risk is probably more important when pragmatic considerations are hidden 
than when they are explicitly endorsed as in Anderson (2010)’s pragmatism or Sangiovanni 
(2008)’s practice-dependence. One important criticism of ideal theorizing is that unless it 
completely abstracts from facts as Cohen’s (2008) does, it runs the risk of hiding pragmatic 
or context-dependent considerations. I thank David Axelsen for bringing this issue to my 
attention.
  141
LEAP 5 (2017)
Why not More Equality? Sufficientarianism and  
Inequalities above the Threshold
views of justice. Casal and Shields have made one step in a good direction 
by suggesting that sufficiency can be compatible with equality or priority. 
The next step could be to recognize the complementarity between 
egalitarian principles and efficiency-concerned principles such as priority 
or leximin, the former being fitter as fundamental principles of justice, the 
latter as rules of regulation. 
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